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STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated; 
§ 30-3-5 (8) (2010) 1,2,3,23,24 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DEBRABOYER, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. 
DARREN BOYER, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appellate Court No. 20100359 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78A-4-103 (2008). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ETC. 
Utah Code Annotated $ 30-3-5 (8) (2010). 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in deterrnining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
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(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the 
payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor 
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the 
payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time 
of separation, in detennining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the 
court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, 
base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of 
short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties1 
respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the 
income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be 
considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If 
one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing 
the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children 
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each 
party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders 
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
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(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address 
needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court 
finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor 
may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse!s financial ability to share living 
expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that 
the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: Respondent/Appellee Darren Boyer ("Mr. Boyer") and 
Petitioner/Appellant ("Ms. Boyer") were married for approximately fifteen years and 
have three minor children. A Petition for Divorce was filed in 2007 in the Second Judicial 
District Court of Weber County, State of Utah. The parties share the joint custody of 
their children following a custody evaluation and trial in this matter. The parties lived 
above their means during the marriage and as a result of this lifestyle, they incurred a 
substantial amount of debt and they accrued few assets. The main asset of the parties is 
Mr. Boyer's business which includes his interest in a commercial building on 25th Street 
in Ogden, Utah. Each party had small retirement accounts. Mr. Boyer was ordered to pay 
all of the marital debt as he requested and he was also awarded his business. Both parties 
were awarded his or her own retirement accounts. Mr. Boyer was ordered to pay to Ms. 
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Boyer alimony to equalize the incomes of the parties. The amount of this alimony aware 
diminishes over a period of time to allow her to become self sufficient. She appeals the 
award of the duration of the alimony, the consideration of fault in the alimony award, the 
amount of the alimony, and the tiered reduction in alimony. Ms. Boyer also appeals the 
division of personal property including Mr. Boyer's business and the retirement accounts 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: This matter was filed with 
the Second District Court in 2007. A trial was held on April 1,2, and 4,2008 with oral 
argument held on April 8 and 14,2010 and May 15,2008, the Honorable Michael D. 
Lyon, presiding. The Court rendered its decision from the bench on June 25,2008. 
Counsel for Mrs. Boyer was directed to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav 
and a Decree of Divorce. He failed to do so despite numerous requests by counsel for 
Mr. Boyer and a further Court Order. Counsel for Mr. Boyer then prepared Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and a Decree of Divorce and filed them with the Court on 
May 6,2009. Mrs. Boyer requested a ten day extension to file objections to the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. Mrs. Boyer then requested an 
additional ten day extension on June 1,2009. The Court entered the Findings of Fact an( 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce on June 1,2009. Mrs. Boyer filed 
Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Decree of Divorce on June 16,2009. Mrs. Boyer then filed Petitioner's (First 
Corrected) Objections to Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
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Law and Decree of Divorce on June 18, 2009. Mrs. Boyer filed a Motion to Set Aside 
Decree of Divorce and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Decree of 
Divorce on July 6,2009. An Objection hearing was held on September 10, 2009. The 
parties then filed memorandum regarding the issue of Mr. Boyer's professional building 
and any equity therein. The Court issued a written Ruling on December 3,2009 
addressing the objections filed by Mrs. Boyer on the Motion to Set Aside the Decree of 
Divorce, and the memoranda regarding the professional building. In its ruling, the Court 
denied Mrs. Boyer's objections and Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce, but set forth 
explanations of the merits of the objections. On January 4,2010, Mrs. Boyer filed a 
Request to Overturn Ruling Signed on December 2,2009 and Request to Hear 
Information that was to be Presented After the September 10,2009 hearing. The Court 
issued a Ruling Denying Petitioner's Motion to Overturn Ruling on January 27, 2010. 
The Court entered Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of 
Divorce on March 26,2010. The Notice of Appeal was filed by Mrs. Boyer on April 23, 
2010. 
C. Statement of Facts: 
1. Petitioner and Appellee ("Mr. Boyer") married the respondent and appellant 
("Ms. Boyer") on July 10,1994. (R. 611/25). The parties resided together until their 
separation in November of 2002. They then reconciled and finally separated in January of 
2007. (R.611/179). 
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2. .The parties have three minor children bom as issue of their marriage. The 
parties were awarded the joint legal and physical custody of the minor children in the 
Decree of Divorce. 
3. Mr. Boyer is a financial planner. He maintains a Class 7 Securities License, 
and a 65, an insurance license and a commodities license. (R.611/26). He owns his own 
professional corporation called Darren Boyer P.C. (R.611/35). The parties greatly 
disputed Mr. Boyer's income during trial. Both parties call financial experts to try to 
determine Mr. Boyer's income. The trial court found that he has a net income of 
approximately $6,600.00 per month. (R.379). 
4. Mr. Boyer purchased a one-half QA) interest in the building in which he does 
business after the separation of the parties. The trial court found that building to be a 
marital asset. (R. 616/1024). The parties disputed the value of the property at trial. A 
2007 appraisal showed the building to be worth $600,000 (R. 426). A formal appraisal 
was conducted after the conclusion of trial in this matter. The market value at the time of 
the second appraisal was $635,000, with an average cost approach of only $700,000. (R. 
433). The trial court stated that it was "not going to look at anything other than the fair 
market value of that home, or that building." (R.609/39). 
5. The parties did not own any other real property at the time of the divorce. The 
parties agreed to the division of the remainder of their personal property. 
6. The Court found that the Mr. Boyer "acquired a partnership interest in a 
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commercial building on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, where he conducts his business. The 
Court finds that there was evidence presented at trial that his business volume included 
the building equity of $32,000.00 that he valued his business at $349,400.00. The Court 
finds that there were business liabilities of $329,100.00 leaving a net value of $20,300.00. 
The Court orders that all of the property from his business, including the building which 
the Court finds to be $20,300,000, be awarded to Respondent." (R. 380). The trial court 
explained that the award of the business to Mr. Boyer is "an offset against the 
indebtedness that he would assume in the marriage." (R. 609/43). 
7. Ms. Boyer is a bookkeeper. She testified that she worked at Western States 
Petroleum part-time as a receptionist when the parties first married. (R. 612/283). She 
worked full time for that company for approximately eight months in 1994, and earned 
$7.00 per hour. (R. 612/284). She also indicated that she stopped working for a few years 
when the children were born and then resumed working in 1999. She testified that she 
has been working for Mr. Boyer's father as a book keeper since 1999 and that she earns 
$11.50 per hour. 
8. The trial court found that Ms. Boyer "is thirty-eight (38) years old and is 
employed as a bookkeeper for her father-in-law at Western State Petroleum. She earns 
approximately $11.50 per hour and works approximately twenty (20) hours per week. 
Based on the prodigious work that she did in pulling together the financial records for the 
analysis of Respondent's income, the Court finds that she can readily secure full-time 
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employment at a rate of least equal to her current wage. The Court also finds that 
Petitioner needs to work full-time to help support herself and the Court advises her of 
this. Accordingly, the Court deems appropriate to impute full-time salary to Petitioner at 
her current hourly wage." (R. 376). 
9. The trial court awarded the vast majority of the marital debt to Mr. Boyer. "The 
parties have incurred a great deal of consumer debt to support their extravagant lifestyle. 
The Court finds that the parties owed nearly $79,000.00 in credit-card debt at the time of 
their separation and is now much more than that. The Respondent agrees to pay off the 
debt which will impact him negatively if he were to file bankruptcy. It could cost the 
Respondent his license. The Court honors his request and orders him to pay all of the 
marital debt that existed at the time of the parties' separation." (R. 381). 
10. The trial court awarded each party his or her own retirement account. Mr. 
Boyer's retirement account had a value of approximately $12,500.00 and Ms. Boyer's 
retirement account had a value of approximately $2,500.00. (R. 381). 
11. In its Ruling of December 3,2009, the trial court further explained why it 
awarded the debt to Mr. Boyer and why Mr. Boyer was also awarded his business 
including the building on 25th Street and the retirement accounts. "True, Respondent 
received his business value of $20,300 and his retirement of $12,500, compared to her 
retirement of $2,500. However, he is assuming most of the marital debt. Specifically, the 
Court ordered that he assume $79,000 in credit card debt and between $60,000 and 
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$125,000 to Brant Boyer, depending on whom the Court: believes most. The Court 
ordered Petitioner to repay a relatively small amount owing to her father. While the Court 
allocated $770 per month for the indebtedness Respondent assumes, he presented 
evidence of a monthly debt service of $3,605. Plainly, Respondent will either need to 
borrow more mone) to service the debt oi v oi khai dei or longer hours Thus, while there 
is a disparity in the allocation of their personal property, it pales in comparison to the 
stress and responsibility, including mounting interest payments, Respondent assumes to 
timely discharge the debt. The alternative was to equalize the property and assess 
not discharge. That posed professional problem for Respondent if Petitioner filed a 
bankruptcy on her share of the debt, as Respondent testified. The Court also felt that 
these parties needed a clean break from each other without lingering property ownership 
entanglements. (R. 539). 
12. The trial court awarded to Ms. Boyer alimony in the amount of $ 1,457 per 
month for a period of five years, commencing July 1, 2008, and then reduced alimony to 
$1,000 per month, beginning July 1,2013 for another five years, and then reduced 
alimony to $800 00 pei montl I until December 31, 2015, and terminated alimony alt that 
time. (R. 616/1061). Counsel for Mr. Boyer asked the trial court when the $800.00 award 
would terminate and the court stated that the "$800.00 terminates on December 31,2015. 
(R. 616/1062). 
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13. However, following objections to the proposed decree of divorce and findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found a mathematical error in its alimony 
award. Therefore, in its Ruling of December 3,2009, the trial court corrected this error. 
"Thus, the Court orders Respondent to pay a corrected sum of $1,428 per month to 
equalize the parties' standard of living. This payment shall be for a period of five years, 
commencing July 1,2008. Thereafter the alimony is reduced to $1,000 per month on July 
1,2013 for another five years ,and then the alimony is reduced to $800.00 per month until 
December 31,2015, at which time alimony shall terminate." (R. 538). 
14. Ms. Boyer testified that she had surgery in August of 2006, (R. 613/522). In 
her surgery, she "had part of my cervix removed and then I had a cone biopsy because I 
had carcinoma insi2 resulting from this and had to have a complete and total 
hysterectomy." (R. 613/522). 
15. Jessica Jacques testified that she and Mr. Boyer had a child together who was 
bom on July 4,2007. (R. 614/661). She also testified that she was diagnosed with HPV in 
May of 2006 and that HPV is a sexually transmitted disease. (R. 613/522). She testified 
that she had at least five sexual partners other than Mr. Boyer although she denied having 
other partners during the marriage. (R. 613/532). 
16. Ms. Boyer testified, on cross examination, that HPV or Human Papilova Virus 
can stay dormant (R. 613/531; 532). 
17. The trial court explained why it ordered the alimony to be reduced over time. 
"The Court was further of the opinion that a gradual diminution of alimony is equitable 
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and gives Petitioner incenti^ i,re along the way to improve her job skills ami heron it" 
increasingly self-sufficient." (R. 539). 
18. The trial court did not award permanent alimony to Ms. Boyer. 
"Fundamentally, the parties do not have a long term marriage; thus permanent alimony, in 
the Court's judgement, was not appropriate. notwithstanding the greatei appearance of 
fault by Respondent." (R. 539). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The parties in this matter had a substantial amount of debt and few assets at the 
time of trial The trial court a/\A aided to ]\ li Boyei the debts of the parties because a 
bankruptcy filing could cause him to lose his license, which enables him to be a financial 
planner. The trial court also awarded to Mr. Boyer his business, including Ms. Boyer's 
equitable interest in that business and his retirement account. Both of these assets 
together do not equally offset the large amount of credit card debt wh ich Mi Boyer 
assumed. Therefore, the trial court's award to Mr. Boyer of his business and his 
retirement account was not an abuse of discretion because this award was a proper offset 
against Ms. Boyer's portion of the marital debt assumed by Mr. Boyer. 
In determ in ing the amount of alimony , the court properly • did not attach a 
consequence to Mr. Boyer's fault. The trial court also found that it was not a long term 
marriage, and Ms. Boyer did not testify to any long term medical problems which prevent 
her from working. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not awarding 
permanent alimony. The trial court also properly corrected its mathematical error in the 
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amount of alimony, so the amount should be upheld. The trial court's tiered reduction in 
alimony should be upheld because such a reduction is supported by the evidence and not 
an abuse of the court's discretion. It encourages and permits Ms. Boyer to become self 
sufficient. Finally, the trial court's finding that the alimony terminate on December 31, 
2015 should be upheld because it is supported by the evidence. The findings of the trial 
court should be upheld because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
alimony or property. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DETERMINING THAT MS. BOYER WAS NOT AWARDED AN EQUITABLE 
INTEREST IN THE COMMERCIAL BUILDING ON 25TH STREET. 
Utah trial courts have "considerable discretion in determining...property 
distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion is demonstrated." Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476 at ^  8 
(Utah Ct. App. 2008) quoting Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Marital property is usually divided equally between the spouses. Id. at \ 13. However, 
"[i]n making its determination '[a] trial court does not consider property division in 
isolation ...[and] shall consider all the circumstances of the parties in detennining the 
distribution of real and personal property."5 Id. At ^  13, quoting Rosendahl v. Rosendahl,, 
876 P.2d 870 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Trial courts must follow a four step process to divide property: 1. Determine what 
is marital and separate property; 2. "Consider whether there are exceptional 
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circumstances that overcome the general presumption that iiiai ital property be divided 
equally betweer parties."/*/. at^fl5;3. Assign values to each item of marital 
property; 4. "Distribute the items of marital property in a manner consistent with that 
distribution strategy, with a view toward allowing each party to go forward with his or her 
separate life." Id. 
In the case currently before the Court, the parties had very few assets and a 
substantial amount of debt. At the time of trial, the parties no longer owned the marital 
residence and the parties agreed to the distribution of the personal property in the home. 
Therefore, the only item of property to be distributed, except foi the retirement itecounts, 
is Mr. Boyer's business, The trial court valued Mr. Boyer's business, including his 
interest in a commercial building on 25th Street in Ogden ("Mr. Boyer's business") at 
$20,300.00. (R. 366). The trial court awarded this business including the commercial 
building on 25th Street in Ogden to Mr. Boyer. In addition, the trial court ordered Mr. 
Boyer to approximately $79,000.00 in marital credit card debt incurred by the parties. 
This award honored Mr.Boyer's request to pay this debt because he could lose his license 
if he had to file bankruptcy due to the debt. (R. 367). 
This award of property to Mr. Boyer was not an abuse of discretion b> the ti ial 
court. First, the trial court determined that Mr. Boyer's business interest including the 
building on 25th Street in Ogden, was a marital asset. (R. 616/1024). Second, the trial 
court determined that an unequal division of property was justified based upon Mr. 
Boyer's assumption of all of the marital debt. (R. 535). Third, the trial court assigned a 
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value of $20,300.00 to that marital asset. In its ruling of December 2009, the trial court 
further explained that the value of the building "appears less than Respondent estimated 
at trial/9 (R. 536) However, the court did not change its ruling based on the new appraisal. 
Fourth, the trial court awarded to Mr. Boyer his business. 
At the time of trial, based on the 2007 building appraisal and the representations of 
the parties, Mr. Boyer's net equity in his business was $20,300.00, which includes the 
commercial building. Based on the appraisal conducted after the trial, the value of the 
building was actually approximately $635,000.00, which is less than the parties estimated 
at the time of trial. Therefore, Mr. Boyer's portion of the equity in his business, including 
the commercial building, was likely less than even the $20,300.00. However, the trial 
court considered only the value of the business, including the building, at the time of trial. 
In an exact equal division of property, Ms. Boyer would receive $10,150.00 as her portion 
of the equity in the business. 
Mr. Boyer also assumed over $79,000.00 in marital credit card debt. This debt 
supported the "extravagant lifestyle" of the parties. (R. 367). Further, Mr. Boyer also 
assumed a debt "between $60,000.00 and $125,000.00 to Brant Boyer, depending on 
whom the Court believes most." (R. 540). The trial court specifically considered this 
unequal distribution of debt in its property division. "Thus, while there is a disparity in 
the allocation of their personal property, it pales in comparison to the stress and 
responsibility, including mounting interest payments, Respondent assumes to timely 
discharge the debt." (R. 540). 
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The trial court expressly awarded the business to Mr. Boyer as an offset against 
Ms. Boyer's portion of the marital debt. The trial court stated that it would " award him 
the property as an offset against the indebtedness that he would assume in the marriage." 
(R. 609/43). In an actual dollar for dollar offset, there is an adclit lonal $29,350.00 of 
marital debt which Mr. Boyer must pay, after the offset. This division allows the parties 
to go forward with their separate lives as there is no longer an equity or debt 
entanglement. The trial court's award of the business equity to Mr. Boyer is therefore not 
only equitable, but more than fair to Ms. Boyer considering all of ilr oiu'uinstances of" Hit; 
parties. Because the trial court properly dctei mined that Mr. Boyer's business was a 
marital debt, assigned a value to that asset, and then divided the asset equitably in a way 
that allows the parties to go forward with their separate lives, it did not abuse its 
discretion in awarding that asset to Mr. Boyer. 
IL THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
TO EACH PARTY HIS AND HER OWN RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS. 
It is well settled Utah law that retirement accounts are a marital asset which need 
to be equitably divided between the two parties. In Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d 84 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2006), the Utah Court of Appeals specifically addressed (lie unequal diviMon of 
retirement benefits. The Court explained "the primary purpose of a property division, in 
conjunction with an alimony award, 'is to achieve a fair, just, and equitable result 
between the parties.'" Id. at Tj 27, quoting Haumont v. Haumont 793 P. 2d 421 at 424 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). The Court further explained that "[although 'retirement accounts 
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are part of the marital estate and they are generally to be equitably divided, an unequal 
division of marital property is justified when the trial court memorializes in commendably 
detailed findings the exceptional circumstance supporting the distribution." Id. at 27, 
quoting Davis v. Davis 76 P.3d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
In the case currently before the Court, the trial court awarded to each party his or 
her own retirement accounts. This division is both equitable and better than equal to Ms. 
Boyer. At the time of trial, Ms. Boyer had a retirement account with a value of $2,500 and 
Mr. Boyer had a retirement account with a value of $12,500. Therefore, there was a net 
difference between the accounts of $5,000. After the offset of Ms. Boyer's portion of the 
equity in Mr. Boyer's business against her half of the marital credit card debt, Mr. Boyer 
assumed $29,350 of Ms. Boyer's one-half of the credit card debt. An additional offset of 
the $5,000 retirement difference to Ms. Boyer results in Mr. Boyer still taking an excess 
portion of Ms. Boyer's one-half credit card debt in the amount of $24,350. Therefore, 
Ms. Boyer received a more than equal offset of the retirement accounts against the joint 
marital debt. 
Further, this equitable division is well reasoned in the trial court's decision. The 
trial court explained its reasoning for the seemingly unequal division in its Rule of 
December 3,2009, 
[t]rue, Respondent received his business value of 
$20,300 and his retirement of $12,500, compared to her 
retirement of $2,500. However, he is assuming most of 
the marital debt. Specifically, the Court ordered that he 
assume $79,000 in credit card debt and between $60,000 
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and $125,000 to Brant Boyer, dependmg on whom the 
Court believes most. The Court ordered Petitioner to 
repay a relatively small amount owing to her father. 
While the Court allocated $770 per month for the 
indebtedness Respondent assumes, he presented 
evidence of a monthly debt service of $3,605. Plainly, 
Respondent will either need to borrow more money to 
service the debt or work harder or longer hours. Thus, 
while there is a disparity in the allocation of their 
personal property, it pales in comparison to the stress 
and responsibility, including mounting interest 
payments, Respondent assumes to timely discharge the 
debt. The alternative was to equalize the property and 
assess Petitioner with a huge debt responsibility that the 
Court felt that she could not and would not discharge. 
That posed professional problem for Respondent if 
Petitioner filed a bankruptcy on her share of the debt, as 
Respondent testified. The Court also felt that these 
parties needed a clean break from each other without 
lingering property ownership entanglements. (R. 539). 
Because the Court equitably and equally divided the retirement benefits of the 
parties based on the total financial picture of the parties, and clearly explained i ts findings 
in doing so, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding to the each party his 
and her own retirement account. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING 
THAT THE ALIMONY AWARDED TO MS. BOYER BE STRUCTURED TO BE 
REDUCED OVER A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME. 
The standard of review for the (rial court's award of alimony is abuse of discretion. 
Thus "[tjrial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony...and 
[determinations of alimony] will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse 
of discretion is demonstrated." Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) quoting 
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Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In the case currently 
before the Court, Ms. Boyer argues that the trial court abused its discretion in reducing 
her alimony award over a period of years. 
An "alimony award for shorter than the term of the marriage will be upheld unless 
it results in a serious inequity evidencing an abuse of the trial court's discretion." Jensen 
v. Jensen, 197 P.3d 117 at ^  16 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). In Jensen, the trial court awarded to 
the wife alimony to the wife for five years, despite that fact that the parties had been 
married for sixteen years. Further, the wife had marketable job skills and had worked 
outside of the home for approximately four years. The Court of Appeals did not find that 
the trial court abused its discretion in the alimony award because "[ejvidence was 
presented to the trial court such that it could, within its discretion, determine that five 
years was a sufficient length of time for Wife to 'get her house in order' so that she would 
no longer require support from Husband." Id. at f 20. 
Similarly, in the case currently before the Court, the trial court's award of alimony 
to terminate at a date certain was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. The parties 
in this case were married for approximately fifteen years at the time of trial. Ms. Boyer 
was "thirty-eight (38) years old and is employed as a bookkeeper for her father-in-law at 
Western State Petroleum." (R. 376). The court imputed her at full time wages at her 
present hourly rate of $11.50 per hour. The trial court explained "[b]ased on the 
prodigious work that she did in pulling together the financial records for the analysis of 
Respondent's income, the Court finds that she can readily secure full-time employment at 
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a rate at least equal to h irrent wage." (R. 376). 
The trial court awarded alimony to her in the amount of $1,428 for five years, 
beginning July 1,2008. Unlike Jenson, however, Ms. Boyer was awarded continuing 
alimony to allow her to gradually become self sufficient Hie trial court awarded Ms. 
Boyer additional alimony in tin nmount of $1,000.00 beginning July 1,2013 for another 
five years, and $800.00 per month until December 31,2015. The trial court terminated 
alimony on December 31,2015. This tiered reduction in the amount of alimony is not an 
abuse of the trial court's discretion because it provides Ms. Hover with 11 nana a I support 
to allow her to become self sufficient 
Although the Utah Supreme Court held that "[generally, it is true that, because of 
the uncertainty of future events, prospective changes to alimony are disfavored." 
Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942 at ^ f 10 (Utah 2008), Ms. Boyer's impn -ved 
financial future is fairly certain The trial court found that she could work full time and 
earn the same wage or a higher wage in the future. The Utah Supreme Court found that 
when "the future event is certain to occur within a known time frame, then prospective 
changes are appropriate." Id. at f 10. 
In the case currently before the Court, the Court could have terminated Ms. 
Boyer's alimony award earlier than December 31,2015. However, the trial court 
determined that the gradual reduction of the alimony, rather than an early elimination of 
alimony, was in Ms. Boyer's best interests. The trial court explained that "a grad 
diminution of alimony is equitable and gives Petitioner incentive along the way to 
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improve her job skills and become increasingly self-sufficient." (R. 539). The tiered 
reduction of alimony thus appears to be based on the trial courts admonition to Ms. Boyer 
to obtain full time employment and to then improve that employment. Because the tiered 
reduction of alimony was based upon the future event of Ms. Boyer's improved job skills 
and position, this alimony structure is not an abuse of the trial court's discretion and 
should be upheld. 
The award of alimony, including the future reduction of alimony, is within the trial 
court's broad discretion. Rather than eliminating alimony after a short period of time, 
which would force Ms. Boyer to quickly become entirely self sufficient, the trial court 
gave her seven years to do so. She has time to obtain full time employment, to adjust her 
living situation, and to learn to live on her own without the support of Mr. Boyer. The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in gradually reducing the alimony because Ms. 
Boyer has adequate time to become self sufficient by increasing her job skills. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT MAKE A CLEAR ERROR IN THE 
AWARD OF ALIMONY OR IN THE TERMINATION DATE OF ALIMONY. 
Ms. "Boyer alleges that the trial court made a clear error in terminating alimony on 
December 31,2015 rather than at least ten years from July 1,2008, and in awarding 
$1,428 in initial alimony rather than $1,457. In reviewing a trial court's award, the court 
of appeals will "reverse a finding only if we determine that it is not based upon 
substantial evidence or if it is clearly erroneous." Allred v. Alfred 835 P.2d 974 at 979 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Utah Court of Appeals further explained how a moving party 
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must demonstrate that the trial court's finding is clearly erroneous. The party who seeks 
to overturn the trial court's findings "has the burden of marshalling the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrating that, despite such evidence, the findings 
are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence and, therefore, 
clearly erroneous." Id. at 979 quoting Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
The trial court initially awarded to Ms. Boyer alimony in the amount of $1,457 per 
month for a five year period, beginning July 1,2008. The trial court then reduced the 
alimony award to $1,000.00 per month for another five years, beginning July 1,2013. 
The trial court then awarded to Ms. Boyer alimony in the amount of $800.00 per month 
until December 31,2015. Following the late written objections of Ms. Boyer, the trial 
court entered a ruling on December 3,2009. In that written ruling, the trial court found a 
mathematical error in the alimony award. The trial court then corrected its mathematical 
error and ordered Mr. Boyer to pay " a corrected sum of alimony in the amount of $1,428 
per month to equalize the parties' standard of living." (R. 538). This amount, rather than 
the $1457.00 is reflected in the Amended Decree of Divorce nunc pro tunc to June 1, 
2009. Because the trial court clearly explained that it had made a mathematical error in 
the amount of the initial alimony award and because it corrected that error, the award of 
$1,428.00 per month in alimony was not an error and should not be changed. 
Ms. Boyer alleges that the trial court erred in terminating alimony on December 
31,2015 because the trial court also provided for alimony for two periods of five years. 
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When the trial court issued its oral ruling regarding alimony, counsel for Mr. Boyer 
recognized this possible discrepancy and specifically asked when alimony in the amount 
of $800.00 terminates. The court clearly stated that alimony terminates on December 31, 
2015. (R. 616). Following written objections by Ms. Boyer and an additional hearing, in 
its written ruling of December 3,2009, the trial court again stated that alimony terminates 
on December 31,2015. 
Therefore, the record is clear that the trial court stated that alimony would end on 
December 31,2015. What is not clear is the amount of the alimony award between July 
1,2013 and December 31,2015. It is possible that the trial court meant for the award of 
$1,000.00 to only last for two years and then for the award of $800.00 to last for the last 
six months of alimony. It is also possible that the trial court meant for the alimony to last 
for ten years and six months and that the court made an error in its calculation of 
December 31,2015. 
However, even if the court made an error in calculating when alimony reduces or 
ends, such an error is not against the clear weight of evidence and therefore not clearly 
erroneous. The trial court explained that Ms. Boyer was capable of working full time and 
that the alimony term would allow her to be self sufficient. This finding was based on her 
.age, lier past and current employment, and the overall division of assets and liabilities 
between the parties. Additionally, the trial court factored the fact that Mr. Boyer assumed 
all of the marital debt into the alimony structure. "The Court is mindful that this is settling 
the Respondent with a substantial amount of debt, but has already factored that debt in 
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large measure into the alimony structure." (R. 381). 
Trial courts have broad discretion in setting alimony awards. As the Utah Court of 
Appeals found in Jensen v. Jensen, 197 P.3d 117, an award of five years of alimony based 
on a fifteen year marriage is not outside of the court's discretion. Similarly, an award to 
Ms. Boyer of seven years and six months of alimony is not an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion in setting alimony in a fifteen year marriage. Because the evidence supports 
the trial court's finding that alimony should terminate on December 31, 2015, this finding 
is not clearly erroneous and should not be set aside. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 
ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF FAULT IN SETTING THE ALIMONY AWARD. 
Utah Code Annotated section 30-3-5 (8) details the seven factors that trial courts 
must consider in setting an alimony award. In addition, subsection (b) states that the 
"court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony." UTAH CODE ANN. § 
30-3-5 (2010), (emphasis added). The Utah Court of Appeals recently addressed how trial 
court should consider fault in settling alimony awards in Mark v. Mark, 223 P.3d 476 
(Utah Ct. App. 2009). In that case, the Court explained that" [w]here the legislature has 
not defined fault in the statute, it is virtually impossible for trial courts to quantify it, and 
the consequences thereof, when fashioning alimony awards." Id. at \ 18. Therefore, the 
Court determined that "until the legislature clearly defines fault in the statute, it is 
inappropriate to attach any consequence to the consideration of fault when making an 
alimony award." Id. at \ 19. The Utah State Legislature did not change the alimony statute 
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in the last legislative session. 
Ms. Boyer alleges that the trial court did not consider the fault of Mr. Boyer in 
awarding alimony and that the court should have considered fault. The trial court 
specifically considered the fault of Mr. Boyer in alimony. "The Court considered fault in 
awarding alimony. In the Court's opinion, this was not a long-term marriage, warranting 
permanent alimony." (R. 535). Additionally, the trial court did not attach a consequence 
to that fault. The Utah Court of Appeals determined that, in making alimony awards, trial 
courts should not attach any consequence to the consideration of fault. Therefore, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in not attaching a consequence to Mr. Boyer's fault, but 
instead, the trial court correctly applied the facts of this case to the law. 
VI. THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS ALIMONY 
AWARD BY NOT CONSIDERING MS. BOYER'S HEALTH CONDITIONS AS A 
RESULT OF OBTAINING A SOCIAL/VENEREAL DISEASE FROM MR. 
BOYER AND THEREFORE AWARDING TO HER PERMANENT ALIMONY. 
Utah Code Annotated section 30-3-5 (8) (h) provides "[ajlimony may not be 
ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage existed unless, at 
any time prior to the termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances 
that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time." UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-
3-5 (2010). 
Ms. Boyer cites Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d 84 (Utah Ct. App. 2006), where the Utah 
Court of Appeals upheld an alimony award based partially on the fault of Mr. Riley. In 
Riley, Mr. Riley lied about an extramarital affair for almost two years, and the trial court 
25 
determined "that the divorce would not have taken place but for Husband's acts of 
adultery." Id. at % 13. In that case, the trial court did not extend the award of alimony 
beyond the length of the marriage. 
In the case currently before the Court, Ms. Boyer requests permanent alimony. 
There was some testimony that Mr. Boyer had a relationship with Jesssica Jacques during 
the marriage and that child was born of that relationship. The trial court specifically 
found "[f]undamentally, the parties do not have a long-term marriage; thus permanent 
alimony, in the Court's judgment, was not appropriate, notwithstanding the greater 
appearance of fault by Respondent." (R. 539). In Riley9 even though the trial court found 
detailed fault with Mr. Riley and, in fact, believed that the divorce was his fault, the trial 
court did not extend alimony beyond the length of the marriage. In the case currently 
before the Court, however, Ms. Boyer alleges that "based on the extreme health problems 
and surgeries that Mrs. Boyer had to endure because of Mr. Boyer's actions, Mrs. Boyer 
should be awarded a permanent alimony award." (Apellanfs Brief at p. 29). Such an 
award is not supported by the evidence presented at trial. 
Although Ms. Boyer testified that she obtained HPV from Mr. Boyer, she also 
testified that she had sexual relations with at least five men other than Mr. Boyer prior to 
their marriage. She also testified that HPV can lay dormant for years. She testified that 
the surgery occurred in 2006, prior to the parties separating for the last time. Ms. Boyer 
did not provide medical documentation indicating that she had HPV, or that she likely 
obtained the disease from Mr. Boyer. She also did not provide any documentation or 
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expert testimony to demonstrate that her surgeries were a result of HPV. Although Ms. 
Boyer stated that she had surgeries, she did not provide evidence that she was unable to 
work as a result of the alleged disease, or that she had any long term consequences as a 
result of the alleged disease except those consequences normally associated with women 
who have hysterectomies. 
Despite the lack of any evidence, not even the testimony of Ms. Boyer, that the 
surgeries have caused Ms. Boyer to be unable to work or meet her needs, Ms. Boyer asks 
for an award of permanent alimony. An award of permanent alimony in this case would 
be merely punitive because Ms. Boyer does not explain any medical justification or other 
extenuating circumstances which may justify a longer alimony award. Because the 
evidence supports a determination that Ms. Boyer should not be awarded permanent 
alimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award to Ms. Boyer 
permanent alimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding to Mr. Boyer his business 
and awarding to each party his or her own retirement accounts because Mr. Boyer was 
also ordered to pay the marital credit card debt of approximately $79,000.00 and a debt to 
his brother of at least $60,000. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding to Ms. Boyer alimony in the amount of $1,428 to be reduced over time because 
she is able to become self sufficient under that structure. Further, the trial court did not err 
in the amount or the duration of alimony as those findings were clearly supported by the 
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facts and evidence. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not awarding to 
Ms. Boyer permanent alimony or in its consideration of fault because fault cannot be used 
to punish or reward a party and because the facts do not warrant permanent alimony. The 
findings of the trial court should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted this ,2010. 
BEAN & MICKEN 
CHRISTINA L. MICKEN ^ 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
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Ruling December 3,2009 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Decree of Divorce 
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WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
DEBRA BOYER, 
Petitioner, 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE 





 Civil No: 074900511 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
Commissioner Daniel W. Garner 
This matter came on for Trial on April 1, 2 and 4, 2008, and oral argument on April 8 and 
14, 2008, before the District Court, the Honorable Michael D. Lyon, District Judge presiding. The 
Petitioner was present and represented by her attorney, Joseph M. Chambers, Logan, Utah. The 
Respondent was present and represented by his attorney, John Cummings, Ogden, Utah. Having 
considered the evidence and arguments of counsel and having rendered its decision from the bench 
•on May 15, 2008 and the court's ruling from December 3, 2009, the Court now enters its formal 
Decree: 
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1. Date of Marriage and Other Dates. The parties were married in Hennifer, Utah, 
on My 10,1993. The parties separated for the fost time in September, 2003, at which time the 
Defendant moved back into the home in February or March, 2004. The parties have been separated 
since January 9,2007, and Petitioner filed for divorce on March 13,2007. Three (3) children have 
been born as issue of this marriage, to wit: Kayne Boyer, born July 29, 1995; Talon Boyer, born 
February 2,1998; and Cormac Boyer, bom August 9, 2001. 
2. Custody. The Court has delineated in case law specifically Rule 4.903, Utah Code 
Annotated, as well as statutory provisions of Title 30, and weighed in the best interest of the 
children. The Court awards the parties joint physical custody and legal custody of the parties' minor 
children. The Court agrees with Dr. Davies, who observed that giving one parent sole joint or legal 
custody would unnecessarily restrict the other parent. The Court finds that the best interest of the 
children will be best served as much as possible with the parties making joint decisions regarding 
health, education and general welfare. Further, the Court finds that if the Petitioner moves from the 
community, the Court would consider changing the custody arrangement. See Parenting Plan 
attached hereto as Exhibit "AM and incorporated herein by reference. 
3. Visitation. As described by Dr. Davies, the parties shall have visitation under a 2:2:5 
parenting time schedule. Monday and Tuesday with Respondent, Wednesday and Thursday with 
Petitioner and then every other Friday, Saturday and Sunday the parties alternate. In addition, the 
parties have agreed that every Easter (Easter Break or school break), the children will be with the 
Petitioner and every UEA holiday, the children will be with the Respondent. This parenting time 
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allows stability with both parents, friends and is dynamic and sensitive to the needs of the children. 
This arrangement remains in place as long as the Petitioner remains in the area and the Respondent 
also facilitates by living geographically close. 
4. Primary Residence. The Petitioner's home is the primary residence for school and 
church purpose. This residency will remain in effect as long as the parties stay within a twenty (20) 
mile radius with each other. It is my expectation that Respondent will remain in the area to facilitate 
this arrangement as per the assurances he made in Court. In the event that there is an impasse on one 
of the key decisions that needs to be made, the Court appoints Dr. Dallas Empey, or such other 
qualified person, to act as a parent-time coordinator, and the parties will equally pay initially that 
expense and then, if necessary, bring the issue back to Court. If the Court feels that one party was 
unreasonable, the Court reserves the right at that time to assess those expenses to the other parent. 
5. Needs of the Children Pertainingto Residency; The Court, having interviewed the 
children during the trial, the Court finds the following: 
A. The Court finds that Kayne wants to live with his father and, under no 
circumstances does he want to move to Oklahoma. Kayne is very close to his father and they have 
similar interest and activities. Kayne has expressed some resentfulness toward his mother for not 
allowing him to live with his father, and this concerns the Court. After some thought regarding 
separating the children and having Kayne live with his father, the Court orders that the siblings shall 
remain together. 
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B. The Court finds that Talon is a buffer between both his parents and his 
siblings. 
C. The Court finds that Cormac is bonded to both parents and wants to be with 
his siblings. Cormac is dependent on his brothers for emotional support and all siblings will flourish 
by remaining together. 
6. Mutual Restraint of the Parties. The Court finds that the children are happy and 
well-adjusted with their custody arrangement, but these children are aware of the conflicts between 
their parents. The Court strong suggests that the parties stop the fighting between themselves before 
their arguing adversely affects their children. The Court orders the parties to desist in demeaning 
one another and to govern their actions. The Court finds that both parents are emotionally stable and 
can provide stability for their children. The Petitioner was the primary care giver in the beginning 
but as the children grew older, the parties shared equally in that responsibility. In terms of the 
kinship between step-parent, the Court finds the relationship with Mrs. Jessica Jacques to be positive 
with the parties' minor children. 
7. Petitionees Income. The Court finds the Petitioner is thirty-eight (38) years old and 
is employed as a bookkeeper for her father-in-law at Western State Petroleum. She earns 
approximately $ 11.50 per hour and works approximately twenty (20) hours per week. Based on the 
prodigious work that she did in pulling together the financial records for the analysis of Respondent's 
income, the Court finds that she can readily secure full-time employment at a rate at least equal to 
her current wage. The Court also finds that Petitioner needs to work full-time to help support herself 
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and the Court advises her of this. Accordingly, the Court deems appropriate to impute full-time 
salary to Petitioner at her current hourly wage. The Court, therefore, imputes Petitioner's salary to 
$1,993.00, which is equal to $406.00 per week multiplied by 4.333 weeks per month. After 
deducting legal and mandatory deductions of approximately $399.00, the Court estimates the 
Petitioner's net income to be approximately $ 1,594.00 per month. The Courts finds that Petitioner 
will receive child support of $677.00 per month, giving the Petitioner a monthly income of $2,271.00 
per month. 
8. Respondent's Income. The Court finds that the Respondent is employed as a stock 
broker and financial advisor for Lindsco Private Provider ("LPL"). The Court finds that Respondent 
does not sale outside of his employment and that Respondent was employed by Smith Barney as a 
stock broker from 1994-2003 earning approximately $160,000.00 per year. The Court finds that 
Smith Barney reduced Petitioner's and other colleagues' incomes by reducing the size of their 
commissions. In so doing, Respondent and colleague, Jeff VonColn, left Smith Barney's employ in 
2003 and secured employment with LPL, sharing office expenses. Since 2003, Respondent and Mr. 
VonColn have moved several times, each time improving the size and amenities of their offices. 
Ascertaining Respondent's income has been difficult because he has not maintained adequate 
accounting records that would normally be found in a business. Respondent's accountant has 
prepared tax filings each year and did so from summaries provided by the Respondent without 
adequate and normal ledger support, by reconciliation with bank statements. The Court finds that 
Respondent's income tax returns are not reliable because the supporting documents to his accountant 
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were not reliable. The Court finds that the Respondent contends that he has a net income of 
approximately $48,000.00 to $63,000.00 per year. The Court disagrees with that amount. The 
evidence of his net income is not only inconsistent with the evidence presented by the parties' 
standard of living, but the Court found the testimony of Clifford Grover particularly persuasive. 
Using Exhibit P43 for its analysis, the Court finds that the Respondent's recorded net income of his 
business of $55,068.00 on his Form 1120S to the IRS in 2005 and $37,708.00 in 2006. These 
amounts already include a deduction for every operating expense Respondent claimed to the IRS. 
The Court finds, however, that Respondent was very aggressive in taking large depreciation 
deductions in both years and as Section 179 write-off in the first year of 2006. While he may 
legitimately claim these deductions with the IRS, they significantly reduce his cash-flow from his 
business which the Court believes it should consider in calculating alimony and child support 
because the cash savings from these deductions flows into his pocket. After deducting Respondent's 
authorized nondeductibles, such as authorized portions of his meals ($6,584.00 in 2005, and 
$10,621.00 in2006, and that is based on the information provided to his own accountant), the Court 
finds that the Respondent actually had a net discretionary cash flow of $43,558.00 in 2005, not 
$5,568.00. Deducting Respondent's income fromLPL, treasury refunds, lines of credit, Visa charges 
and other loans enumerated in Exhibit "43", the Court finds that Respondent had additional direct 
deposits from his business to his personal account of $58,534.00 in 2005 and $58,222.00 in 2006. 
Thus, the evidence preponderates an income of $96,524.00 in2005, and $ 122,563.00 in 2006. Using 
the same analysis for 2007, Mr. Grover also opined that Respondent's income was $97,867.00 in 
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2007. However, even Respondent admits that distractions of the divorce reduced his income in 
2007. Considering all of this evidence, the Court finds that Respondent's discretionary cash-flow 
for his business for the purpose of establishing alimony and child-support, is approximately 
SI 10,000.00 per year. I also believe that he has the potential to increase his income once the divorce 
is behind him. The Court finds that after anticipated taxes, the Respondent has a net income of 
approximately $6,600.00 per month, or $79,200.00 per year. In passing, the Court observes that 
Respondent's claim of financial difficulty was the result of extravagant living. 
9. Petitioner's Budget and Expenses, Tht Petitioner estimates that her reasonable 
monthly expenses, including the debt to her father and her post-separation credit-card debt of 
approximately $6,067.00 per month. The Court finds that Petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses 
for herself and the children is approximately $4,967.00 per month. Combiner her net income of 
$1,594.00 and child support from Respondent of $677.00 per month, the Petitioner's income is 
$2,271.00 per month, which leaves Petitioner a $2,696.00 short-fall each month. 
10. Respondent's Budget and Expenses. Respondent estimates his reasonable 
expenses, excluding alimony and child support, to be $8,300.00. This amount includes all marital 
debt to Petitioner's father and post-separation credit-card debt. The Court finds that Respondent's 
reasonable monthly expenses for himself and the children is approximately $5,762.00 per month. 
Adding the child-support obligation of $677.00 per month, the Respondent has reasonable monthly 
expenses of $6,439,00 per month and leaves him with $217.00 per month. 
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11 • Alimony. To equalize the parties' standard of living, the Court orders the Respondent 
to pay the Petitioner $1,428.00 in alimony each month for a period of five (5) years, commencing 
on July 1, 2008. Thereafter, the alimony is reduced to $1,000.00 per month on July 1, 2013, for 
another five (5) years and then the alimony is reduced to $800.00 per month until December 31, 
2015, at which time the alimony shall terminate. In any event, the alimony will terminate at the 
remarriage or death of the Petitioner. 
12. Child-Surmort. The Court finds that Petitioner's gross monthly income is $ 1,993.00. 
Respondent's gross monthly income is $9,167.00. The combined support is $2,056.00 for the 
children. Petitioner's responsibility for the children is eighteen percent (18%). Respondent's 
responsibility for the children is eighty-two percent (82%). For purpose of the child support 
worksheet Petitioner will have the children 183 nights per year, while the Respondent will have the 
•children 182 nights per year. The Court finds that calculation to be $676.84, rounded up to $677.00, 
beginning July 1,2008. The Respondent shall also maintain health insurance for the benefit of the 
parties' minor children. Each party, however, shall pay one-half (14) of those premium costs and one-
half (VS) of all uninsured medical expenses for the benefit of the minor children. 
13. Property. The Court finds that the Respondent acquired a partnership interest in a 
commercial building on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, where he conducts his business. The Court 
finds that there was evidence presented at trial that his business volume included the building equity 
of $32,000.00 that he valued his business at $349,400.00. The Court finds that there were business 
liabilities of $329,100.00 leaving a net value of $20,300.00. The Court orders that all of the property 
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from his business, including the building which the Court finds to be $20,300.00, be awarded to 
Respondent. 
14. Marital Debts. The parties have incurred a great deal of consumer debt to support 
their extravagant lifestyle. The Court finds that the parties owed nearly $79,000.00 in credit-card 
debt at the time of their separation and is now much more than that. The Respondent agrees to pay 
off the debt which will impact him negatively if he were to file bankruptcy. It could cost the 
Respondent his license. The Court honors his request and orders him to pay all of the marital debt 
that existed at the time of the parties' separation. The Petitioner will assume all of the debt to her 
father and all post-separation debt incurred without Respondent's knowledge or approval, including 
her credit-card debt. Respondent will assume all debt that he incurred since the date of the 
separation. The Court is mindful that this is settling the Respondent with a substantial amount of 
debt, but has already factored that debt in large measure into the alimony structure. 
15. Personal Property. The Court awards each party his or her retirement accounts. 
Respondent's retirement account is valued at approximately $12,500.00. Petitioner's retirement 
account is valued at approximately $2,500.00. The Court adopts the rest of the parties' agreement 
with respect to personal property. 
16. Tax Deductions. In even years beginning in tax year 2008, the Defendant shall be 
allowed to claim as head of household two (2) minor children as tax exemptions for income tax 
purposes for state and federal taxation and the Petitioner shall be allowed to claim as head of 
household one (1) minor child as tax exemptions for income tax purposes for state and federal 
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taxation. In odd years beginning with the tax year 2009, Petitioner shall be allowed to claim as head 
of household two (2) minor children as tax exemptions for income tax purposes for state and federal 
taxation and that the Respondent shall be allowed to claim as head of household one (1) minor child 
as tax exemptions for income tax purposes for state and federal taxation as long as there are three 
(3) children to claim. When there are only two (2) children eligible to be claimed as tax exemptions 
for income tax purposes, each party shall claim one (1) child each year. When there in only one (1) 
child to claim as head of household and as a tax exemption, the parties shall alternate claiming that 
child every other year. However, in order for the Respondent to be eligible to claim any children as 
and for income tax exemptions, he must be current in his child-support obligation on December 31 st 
of each year he wishes to claim the children. 
DATED this ^ Q_ day of January, 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
Lho^ X DISTRICT COURT JUDCjtf"' 
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AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NUNC PRO 
TUNC TO JUNE 3, 2009 
Civil No: 074900511 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
Commissioner Daniel W. Garner 
This matter came on for Trial on April 1, 2 and 4, 2008, and oral argument on April 8 and 
•14,2008, before the District Court, the Honorable Michael D. Lyon, District Judge presiding. The 
Petitioner was present and represented by her attorney, Joseph M. Chambers, Logan, Utah. The 
Respondent was present and represented by his attorney, John Cummings, Ogden, Utah. Having 
considered the evidence and arguments of counsel and having rendered its decision from the bench 
on May 15, 2008 and the courts ruling from December 3, 2009, the Court now enters its formal 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
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074900511 BOYERfDARREN 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Date of Marriage and Other Dates, The parties were married in Hennifer, Utah, 
on July 10, 1993. The parties separated for the first time in September, 2003, at which time the 
Defendant moved back into the home in February or March, 2004. The parties have been separated 
since January 9,2007, and Petitioner filed for divorce on March 13,2007. Three (3) children have 
been born as issue of this marriage, to wit: Kayne Boyer, bom July 29, 1995; Talon Boyer, born 
February 2,1998; and Cormac Boyer, born August 9, 2001. 
2. Custody. The Court has delineated in case law specifically Rule 4.903, Utah Code 
Annotated^ as well as statutory provisions of Title 30, and weighed in the best interest of the 
children. The Court awards the parties joint physical custody and legal custody of the parties' minor 
children. The Court agrees with Dr. Davies, who observed that giving one parent sole joint or legal 
custody would unnecessarily restrict the other parent. The Court finds that the best interest of the 
children will be best served as much as possible with the parties making joint decisions regarding 
health, education and general welfare. Further, the Court finds that if the Petitioner moves from the 
community, the Court would consider changing the custody arrangement. See Parenting Plan 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. 
3. Visitation. As described by Dr. Davies, the parties shall have visitation underz2:2:5 
parenting time schedule. For example: Monday and Tuesday with Respondent, Wednesday and 
Thursday with Petitioner and then every other Friday, Saturday and Sunday the parties alternate. In 
addition, the parties have agreed that every Easter (Easter break or school break) the children will 
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be with the Petitioner and every UEA holiday the children will be with the Respondent. This 
parenting time allows stability with both parents, friends and is dynamic and sensitive to the needs 
of the children. This arrangement remains in place as long as the Petitioner remains in the area and 
the Respondent also facilitates by living geographically close. 
4. Primary Residence. The Petitioner's home is the primary residence for school and 
church purpose. This residency will remain in effect as long as the parties stay within a twenty (20) 
mile radius with each other. It is my expectation that Respondent will remain in the area to facilitate 
this arrangement as per the assurances he made in Court. In the event that there is an impasse on one 
of the key decisions that needs to be made, the Court appoints Dr. Dallas Empey, or such other 
qualified person, to act as a parent-time coordinator, and the parties will equally pay initially that 
expense and then, if necessary, bring the issue back to Court. If the Court feels that one party was 
unreasonable, the Court reserves the right at that time to assess those expenses to the other parent. 
5. Needs of the Children Pertaining to Residency: The Court, having interviewed the 
children during the trial, the Court finds the following: 
A. The Court finds that Kayne wants to live with his father and, under no 
circumstances does he want to move to Oklahoma. Kayne is very close to his father and they have 
similar interest and activities. Kayne has expressed some resentfulness toward his mother for not 
allowing him to live with his father, and this concerns the Court. After some thought regarding 
separating the children and having Kayne live with his father, the Court orders that the siblings shall 
remain together. 
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B. The Court finds that Talon is a buffer between both his parents and his 
siblings. 
C. The Court finds that Cormac is bonded to both parents and wants to be with 
his siblings. Cormac is dependent on his brothers for emotional support and all siblings will flourish 
by remaining together, 
6. Mutual Restraint of the Parties. The Court finds that the children are happy and 
well-adjusted with their custody arrangement, but these children are aware of the conflicts between 
their parents. The Court strong suggests that the parties stop the fighting between themselves before 
their arguing adversely affects their children. The Court orders the parties to desist in demeaning 
one another and to govern their actions. The Court finds that both parents are emotionally stable and 
can provide stability for their children. The Petitioner was the primary care giver in the beginning 
but as the children grew older, the parties shared equally in that responsibility. In terms of the 
kinship between step-parent, the Court finds the relationship with Mrs. Jessica Jacques to be positive 
with the parties' minor children. 
7. Petitioner1*; Income. The Court finds the Petitioner is thirty-eight (38) years old and 
is employed as a bookkeeper for her father-in-law at Western State Petroleum. She earns 
approximately $11.50 per hour and works approximately twenty (20) hours per week. Based on the 
prodigious work that she did in pulling together the financial records for the analysis of Respondent's 
income, the Court fmds that she can readily secure full-time employment at a rate at least equal to 
her current wage. The Court also finds that Petitioner needs to work full-time to help support herself 
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and the Court advises her of this. Accordingly, the Court deems appropriate to impute full-time 
salary to Petitioner at her current hourly wage. The Court, therefore, imputes Petitioner's salary to 
$1,993.00, which is equal to $406.00 per week multiplied by 4.333 weeks per month. After 
deducting legal and mandatory deductions of approximately $399.00, the Court estimates the 
Petitioner's net income to be approximately $1,594.00 per month. The Courts finds that Petitioner 
willreceivechildsupportof$677.00permonth,givingthePetitioneramonthlyincomeof$2>271.00 
per month. 
8. P » T n n r W S Income. The Court finds that the Respondent is employed as a stock 
broker and financial advisor for Lindsco Private Provider ("LPL"). The Court finds that Respondent 
does not sale outside of his employment and that Respondent was employed by Smith Barney as a 
stock broker from 1994-2003 earning approximately $160,000.00 per year. The Court finds that 
Smith Barney reduced Petitioner's and other colleagues' incomes by reducing the size of their 
commissions. In so doing, Respondent and colleague, Jeff VonColn, left Smith Barney's employ in 
2003 and secured employment with LPL, sharing office expenses. Since 2003, Respondent and Mr. 
VonColn have moved several times, each time improving the size and amenities of their offices. 
Ascertaining Respondent's income has been difficult because he has not maintained adequate 
accounting records that would normally be found in a business. Respondent's accountant has 
prepared tax filings each year and did so from summaries provided by the Respondent without 
adequate and normal ledger support, by reconciliation with bank statements. The Court finds that 
Respondent's income tax returns are not reliable because the supporting documents to his accountant 
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were not reliable. The Court finds that the Respondent contends that he has a net income of 
approximately $48,000.00 to $63,000.00 per year. The Court disagrees with that amount. The 
evidence of his net income is not only inconsistent with the evidence presented by the parties' 
standard of living, but the Court found the testimony of Clifford Grover particularly persuasive. 
Using Exhibit P43 for its analysis, the Court finds that the Respondent's recorded net income of his 
business of $55,068.00 on his for 1120S to the IRS in 2005 and $37,708.00 in 2006. These amounts 
already include a deduction for every operating expense Respondent claimed to the IRS. The Court 
finds, however, that Respondent was very aggressive in taking large depreciation deductions in both 
years and as Section 179 write-off in the first year of 2006. While he may legitimately claim these 
deductions with the IRS, they significantly reduce his cash-flow from his business which the Court 
believes it should consider in calculating alimony and child support because the cash savings from 
these deductions flows into his pocket. After deducting Respondent's authorized nondeductibles, 
such as authorized portions of his meals ($6,584.00 in 2005, and $10,621.00 in 2006, and that is 
based on the information provided to his own accountant), the Court finds that the Respondent 
actually had a net discretionary cash flow of $43,558.00 in 2005, not $5,568.00. Deducting 
Respondent's income from LPL, treasury refunds, lines of credit, Visa charges and other loans 
enumerated in Exhibit "43", the Court finds that Respondent had additional direct deposits from his 
business to his personal account of $58,534.00 in 2005 and $58,222.00 in 2006. Thus, the evidence 
preponderates an income of $96,524.00 in 2005, and $122,563.00 in 2006. Using the same analysis 
for 2007, Mr. Grover also opined that Respondent's income was $97,867.00 in 2007. However, even 
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Respondent admits that distractions of the divorce reduced his income in 2007. Considering all of 
this evidence, the Court finds that Respondent's discretionary cash-flow for his business for the 
purpose of establishing alimony and child-support, is approximately $110,000.00 per year. I also 
believe that he has the'potential to increase his income once the divorce is behind him. The Court 
finds that after anticipated taxes, the Respondent has a net income of approximately $6,600.00 per 
month or $79,200.00 per year. In passing, the Court observes that Respondent's claim of financial 
difficulty was the result of extravagant living. 
9. Petitioner's Budget and Expenses. The Court estimates that the Petitioner has 
reasonable monthly expenses, including the debt to her father and her post-separation credit-card 
debt of approximately $6,067.00 per month. The Court finds that Petitioner's reasonable monthly 
expenses for herself and the children is approximately $4,967.00 per month. Combiner her net 
income of $1,594.00 and child support from Respondent of $677.00 per month, the Petitioner's 
income is $2,271.00 per month, which leaves Petitioner a $2,696.00 short-fall each month. 
10, Respondents Budget and Expenses. Respondent estimates his reasonable 
expenses, excluding alimony and child support, to be $8,300.00. This amount includes all marital 
debt to Petitioner's father and post-separation credit-card debt. The Court finds that Respondent's 
reasonable monthly expenses for himself and the children is approximately $5,762.00 per month. 
Adding the child-support obligation of $677.00 per month, the Respondent has reasonable monthly 
expenses of $6,439.00 per month and leaves him with a $217.00 per month short-fall. 
11. Alimony. To equalize the parties' standard of living, the Court orders the Respondent 
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to pay the Petitioner $1,428.00 in alimony each month for a period of five (5) years, commencing 
on July 1, 2008. Thereafter, the alimony is reduced to $1,000.00 per month on July 1, 2013, for 
another five (5) years and then the alimony is reduced to $800.00 per month until December 31, 
2015, at which time the alimony shall terminate. In any event, the alimony will terminate at the 
remarriage or death of the Petitioner. 
12. Child-Support. The Court finds that Petitioner's gross monthly income is $1,993.00. 
Respondent's gross monthly income is $9,167.00. The combined support is $2,056.00 for the 
children. Petitionees responsibility for the children is eighteen percent (18%). Respondent's 
responsibility for the children is eighty-two percent (82%). For purpose of the child support 
worksheet, Petitioner will have the children 183 nights per year, while the Respondent will have the 
children 182 nights per year. The Court finds that calculation to be $676.84, rounded up to $677.00. 
The Respondent shall also maintain health insurance for the benefit of the parties' minor children. 
Each party, however, shall pay one-half (VS) of those premium costs and one-half (14) of all uninsured 
medical expenses for the benefit of the minor children. 
13. Property. The Court finds that the Respondent acquired a partnership interest in a 
commercial building on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, where he conducts his business. The Court 
finds that there was evidence presented at trial that his business volume included the building equity 
of $32,000.00 that he valued his business at $349,400.00, The Court finds that there were business 
liabilities of $329,100.00 leaving a net value of $20,300.00. The Court orders that all of the property 
from his business including the building, which the Court finds to be $20,300.00, be awarded to 
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Respondent. 
14. Marital Debts. The parties have incurred a great deal of consumer debt to support 
their extravagant lifestyle. The Court finds that the parties owed nearly $79,000.00 in credit-card 
debt at the time of their separation and is now much more than that. The Respondent agrees to pay 
off the debt which will impact him negatively if he were to file bankruptcy. It could cost the 
Respondent his license. The Court honors his request and orders him to pay all of the marital debt 
that existed at the time of the parties' separation. The Petitioner will assume all of the debt to her 
father and all post-separation debt incurred without Respondent's knowledge or approval, including 
her credit-card debt. Respondent will assume all debt that he incurred since the date of the 
separation. The Court is mindful that this is settling the Respondent with a substantial amount of 
debt, but has already factored that debt in large measure into the alimony structure. 
15. m<mLPl<mm- The Court awards each party his or her retirement accounts. 
Respondent's retirement account is valued at approximately $12,500.00. Petitioner's retirement 
account is valued at approximately $2,500.00. The Court adopts the rest of the parties' agreement 
with respect to personal property. 
l6.T^xDeductlon. In even years beginning in tax year 2008, the Defendant shall be allowed 
to claim as head of household two (2) minor children as tax exemptions for income tax purposes for 
state and federal taxation and the Petitioner shall be allowed to claim as head of household one (1) 
minor child as tax exemptions for income to purposes for state and federal taxation. In odd years 
beginning with the tax year 2009, Petitioner shall be allowed to claim as head of household two (2) 
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minor children as tax exemptions for income tax purposes for state and federal taxation and that the 
Respondent shall be allowed to claim as head of household one (1) minor child as tax exemptions 
for income tax purposes for state and federal taxation as long as there are three (3) children to claim. 
When there are only two (2) children eligible to be claimed as tax exemptions for income tax 
purposes, each party shall claim one (1) child each year. When there in only one (1) child to claim 
as head of household and as a tax exemption, the parties shall alternate claiming that child every 
other year. However, in order for the Respondent to be eligible to claim any children as and for 
income tax exemptions, he must be current in his child-support obligation on December 31 st of each 
year he wishes to claim the children. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The parties shall be awarded a Decree of Divorce as set out in the Findings of Fact 
above. * i I 
DATED this c/^day of January, GWO. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISfRICT C6URT JUDGE I 
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TO: RESPONDENT 
COMMONSWUW^ bet ^
 Your ^ . ^ ,f must be 
C t " « ^ ) * » * « se^ice. Kind!, g o « m yourse,f acCorf,ng,y. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
• prepaid this g^ t f iy of January, 2010, to the following: 
Debra Boyer 
1374 W. 1100 N. 
Ogden, UT 84404 UO/AAi^^MW^^^1^ 
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Judge Michael D. Lyon 
Case No. 074900511 
Background 
A brief history of the case leading to the Court's ruling today is relevant. A multi-day trial 
in this case concluded on May 15. 2008, with closing arguments. After taking the matter under 
advisement, the Court issued a bench ruling on June 25,2008. Because neither party had 
submitted at trial a current appraisal on Respondent's professional building, the Court reluctantly 
allowed the parties to complete that, with the understanding that the Court might alter its findings 
and decision respecting that portion of the case. 
At the time the Court issued its decision, it directed Petitioner's counsel, Joseph 
Chambers, to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce. When such 
documents were not forthcoming, Respondent's counsel, John Cummings, sent reminder letters 
4o Mr. Chambers on July 29 and September23,2008. On October 23, Mr. Cummings felt 
obliged to file a motion to compel Mr. Chambers to prepare the final papers. The Court issued an 
order on November 24? 2008, requiring Mr. Chambers to prepare the final papers within 10 days. 
When counsel ignored the order, Respondent filed a motion on February 4, 2009, for Petitioner 
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to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for the failure of her counsel to submit the 
findings, conclusions, and decree of divorce, as directed by the Court. In truth, this order to show 
cause should have been directed at Mr. Chambers, not his client. On the date of the order to show 
cause hearing, February 24, Mr. Chambers faxed to Respondent a draft of the final papers, and 
Respondent cancelled the hearing. Within days of the hearing, Respondent approved Petitioner's 
draft and requested Mr. Chambers to prepare them in final form. 
From February 25, 2009, to May 6, 2009, Mr. Chambers failed to follow through again, 
despite Mr. Cummings' repeated telephone calls and letters to Mr. Chambers. Consequently, Mr. 
Cummings prepared the final papers in an effort to conclude this divorce action, and filed them 
with the Court on May 6, 2009, showing a certificate of mailing to Mr. Chambers on the same 
date. At the same time, Mr. Cummings sent a request to submit for decision to the Court. 
On May 19. 2009, Mr. Chambers requested an additional 10 days to file his objections, 
but failed to do so within that period. On June 1, 2009, the Court signed and entered findings of 
fact, conclusions, and a decree of divorce prepared by Mr. Cummings. Later that day, the Court 
received from Mr. Chambers a second request for an extension of 15 days, based on counsel's 
health problems. The Court signed the accompanying order also on June 1, 2009, over 
Respondent's objections again. 
On June 16, 2009, Petitioner filed her objections to the findings, conclusions of law, and 
decree, and two days later filed a corrected copy of her objections. On July 6, 2009, Petitioner 
filed a motion to set aside the decree of divorce. 
Respondent responded to Petitioner's objections on July 10, 2009, and the Court held an 
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objection hearing on September 10,2009. At the hearing, the parties informed the Court that they 
had stipulated to changes regarding child parent time and the income dependency exemptions. 
They also agreed that both alimony and child support shall commence July 1, 2008. Respondent 
objected to any other changes in the decree. Except to correct any error in the findings that 
clearly was attributable to inadvertence, such as a mathematical error, the Court informed 
counsel that it would not retry the case on Petitioner's objections. The hearing focused on the 
appraisal of Respondent's professional building and its equity, as reserved by the Court at the 
time of rendering its decision. The Court agreed to receive additional memoranda from counsel 
on the professional building and child support within 15 days. 
Respondent filed his memorandum on September 28, 2009. On October 27,2009, Mr. 
Chambers filed a motion for an extension of 15 days in which to file his client's memorandum, 
and contemporaneously filed the Petitioner's memorandum. Over Respondent's objections, the 
Court signed the order for the extension based on Mr. Chamber's affidavit alleging his further 
health problems. 
The Court having considered those memoranda and Petitioner's objections and 
Respondent's response, now addresses Petitioner's objections, the equity in Respondent's 
professional building, and the child support. 
Proper Procedure 
To begin, objections to Xhtform of proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
decree of divorce are appropriate. These objections must be filed with the court within five days 
following service of the proposed order. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2). However, challenges to the 
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sufficiency of the evidence for the Court's findings, or the correctness of its decisions, or alleged 
errors of law are procedurally inappropriate matters to include in objections. These matters must 
be addressed under rules 52 and 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 52 grants to the Court authority to review the sufficiency of the evidence for its 
findings of fact, if a motion is filed within 10 days after entry of a judgment. Utah R. Civ. 
Procedure 52(b). Any motion to open a judgment, "take additional [evidence], amend findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, and direct the entry of a new judgment" is governed by rule 59, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah R. Civ. P 59(a). Such a motion must be filed in 10 days after 
entry of the judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 59(c). Likewise, "any motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P 
59(e). 
Petitioner filed no motion under rule 52 to amend findings of fact or under rule 59 to 
amend the decree of divorce. Consequently, she asserts no provisions of the rule to invoke the 
Court's jurisdiction to review her claims. On this basis the Court denies her claims disputed by 
Respondent. Even liberally construing Petitioner's objections as a motion to amend findings and 
the decree under rule 59(a)(6) and (7), the Court reviews only Petitioner's first objection filed on 
June 16. The corrected one filed on June 18, to the extent it enlarges the number or character of 
the objections, is untimely, as being outside 10 days governed by the rule, and filed without leave 
of court. The Court will also consider Petitioner's memorandum filed November 19, 2009, 
regarding the professional building and child support only, pursuant to the Court's permission 
from the September 10, 2009, hearing. Permission to file a memorandum on those two issues 
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was not an invitation to argue again other aspects of the Court's decision. 
In this case, Mr. Cummings served his proposed decree of divorce on May 6, 2009. 
Allowing three days for mailing, five days to object, and excluding intervening time for weekend 
days, Petitioner's objections to the form of the decree were due on or before May 17, 2009, two 
days before Mr. Chambers filed his first motion to extend the time to file Petitioner's objections. 
Therefore, Petitioner waived any objection to the form of the findings, conclusions of law, and 
decree. 
Ordinarily, the Court would be inclined to look past those two days of being late and 
reach the merits of any objections as to form, but in this case it seems very unfair to the 
Respondent and to the integrity of the judicial system. First, the Court ordered Mr. Chambers, not 
Mr. Cummings, to prepare the final papers, yet he failed to do so over a period of eight months, 
despite repeated prodding and motions from Mr. Cummings to compel Mr. Chambers to prepare 
them. Second, even after Mr. Chambers finally prepared a draft of the final papers, and Mr. 
Cummings approved them within a few days of receiving them, Mr. Chambers declined to 
prepare them in final form and submit them to the Court. An additional two more months passed. 
Finally, and no doubt in frustration with Mr. Chambers' inaction, Mr. Cummings prepared his 
own version of the findings, conclusions of law, and decree. At that point, Mr. Chambers 
declined to approve them or timely object to them. At what point, as a matter of fairness, does 
Petitioner waive her objection as to form? This Court believes she has. 
The Court is cognizant that Ms. Lilly Stonecipher, Mr. Chambers's secretary, mentions in 
her affidavit of May 28, 2009, in support of Petitioner's second request for an extension, that 
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"Mr. Chambers unexpectedly has become extremely ill and due to this illness has not been able 
to return to the office." This is a legitimate reason for the second extension only. 
Petitioner's objections to Respondent's proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
decree of divorce, as a whole, go well beyond the form of the documents. They appear to have 
the objective to have the Court reconsider a number of the Courts findings and decisions. Post-
judgment motions to reconsider are not recognized under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Gillett v. Price, 135 P. 3d 861, 863 (Utah 2006). Therefore, to that extent, all of Petitioner's 
objections are denied, except as to the equity in Respondent's professional building, which the 
Court expressly reserved when it issued its decision. 
Beyond the ostensible motion to reconsider, Petitioner has not cited any rule of procedure 
that vests the Court with jurisdiction to amend its findings or its order. In Gillett, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
In our system, the rules provide the source of available relief. They "[are] 
designed to provide a pattern of regularity of procedure which the parties 
and the courts [can] follow and rely upon." Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 
2d 74, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (Utah 1966). Accordingly, the form of a 
motion does matter because it directs the court and litigants to the specific, 
and available, relief sought. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b) ("A motion shall be 
in writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and 
the grounds for the relief sought."). Hereafter, when a party seeks relief 
from a judgment, it must turn to the rules to determine whether relief 
exists, and if so, direct the court to the specific relief available. Parties can 
no longer leave this task to the court by filing so-called motions to 
reconsider and relying upon district courts to construe the motions within 
the rules. 
Id 
Petitioner has not turned to rule 52 or 59, or pointed to specific portions of these rules, to 
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assist the Court in properly assessing whether relief should be granted under these rules. Nor has 
she substantially complied with the requirements of these rules. Instead, she has, or her counsel 
has, left that burden to the Court to determine whether relief exists and should be granted. 
Therefore, this Court does not need to go beyond the foregoing analysis. Petitioner's objections 
should be dismissed based on form and substance. Accordingly, the objections are denied, except 
those dealing with the value of the Respondent's professional building and its bearing on marital 
equity in that building. 
Petitioner's Objections 
With great reluctance, however, the Court will offer some explanation on the merits of 
the objections. The Court does so only because it cares about what the parties to this case think 
about the judge who tried their case. 
Petitioner's Objection 1: Petitioner objects that the findings do not include that the Court 
found Respondent's testimony not credible. First, this objection goes to the form of the findings, 
and is dismissed. To the extent that the presence of this finding goes to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support other findings or orders, the Court overrules the objection. First, Petitioner 
points to no context in which the Court made the statement, so that the Court can evaluate the 
scope of the finding. Again, Petitioner's counsel leaves that burden on the Court. Second, this 
Court may not dismiss Respondent's testimony entirely based on the Court making this kind of a 
finding, especially if Respondent's testimony is corroborated by other evidence. The Court has 
some memory of making that statement about Respondent, particularly as it related to his 
gambling and possibly his general lifestyle. At any rate, the Court weighed his general credibility 
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in rendering its decision on the various issues. In short, even if that finding were included, it 
would not alter any decision the Court made. 
Petitioner's Objections 2 and 3: The objections go to the form of the findings. The 
objections are waived. To the extent that the objections go to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the Court's decision regarding alimony, the Court is well aware that fault is a factor in 
determining alimony. The Court's notes used to render the decision include a note for the Court 
to tell the parties to be judicious in writing the findings, perhaps out of concern for discretion that 
too much detail for the parties' children to read in the future disserves their relationship with 
their children. In any event, the Court considered fault in awarding alimony. In the Court's 
opinion, this was not a long-term marriage, warranting permanent alimony. 
Petitioner's Objection 4\ The objection is overruled. The Court made adequate findings 
in its bench ruling to support its decision regarding alimony and the property division. To the 
extent those findings and reasoning do not appear in the formal findings of fact, Petitioner 
waived them when she did not timely object to the form of the findings. 
Petitioner's Objection 5: In reviewing the Court's notes prepared for the decision, the 
Court found that Respondent's business was valued at $349,400. Included in this valuation is his 
claim of equity in the professional building of $32,000. The Court further found that Respondent 
has business liabilities of $329,100, leaving actual net equity in his business of $20,300. The 
Court awarded that equity to Respondent, based on his assumption of all of the marital debt, 
subject to a possible further review based on a more current appraisal than the 2006 appraisal 
submitted at trial. Based on the appraisal of July 25, 2008, following trial, retroactive to July 1, 
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2008, the Court finds that the building has a value of $635,000. One-half of that value belongs to 
Respondent and the other one-half belongs to Respondent's business partner. Thus, the equity 
appears to be less than Respondent estimated at trial. In any event, the 2008 appraisal does not 
change the Court's decision. If the shell on the other two floors of the building have been built 
out since the trial, resulting in greater value to the building, the Court will not consider that 
evidence. The Court will consider only the evidence that existed at the time of trial. 
Petitioner's Objection 6: Petitioner raises issues of delinquent alimony and child support 
due her, yet she points to no trial evidence presented on these issues. If, in fact, Respondent owed 
money at trial for temporary alimony and child support and for accrued medical expenses, she 
should have raised those claims. Otherwise, those claims are barred by res judicata. The final 
order replaces the temporary order. Consequently, all temporary orders and liabilities under those 
orders are merged into the final order, unless otherwise reserved or addressed in the final order. 
That may seem harsh, but the Court sees no legal basis of relief 
The Court has reviewed the minute entry and the order from the hearing in July 2007, 
following an objection hearing on the court commissioner's recommendations regarding 
temporary alimony and child support. Nowhere in those documents does the Court promise at the 
time of trial that if it is determined that alimony and child support are within the range of support 
found by the commissioner, the Court would make that up at the time of trial. The commissioner 
made his recommendations. Respondent objected. The Court reviewed them in an evidentiary 
hearing, and it made its own decision. That decision governed temporary alimony and child 
support until trial 
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Petitioner's Objection 7: The parties agreed to adjust parent time by a post-decree 
stipulation. 
Petitioner's Objection 8: Petitioner's objections regarding the Court's findings over the 
respective bonding of the children to each parent just argues the evidence but does not change the 
Court's findings and the basis of those findings. Further, she offers no specific objection to the 
parenting plan Respondent submitted except that Mr. Cummings prepared and unilaterally 
submitted one. Petitioner waived this objection when Mr. Chambers defaulted in preparing one 
himself. 
Petitioner's Objection 9: Petitioner's objections regarding the amount of the parties' 
incomes only argues the evidence but offers no evidence of clear error. As the Court 
acknowledged in the hearing on September 10, 2009, it inadvertently misspoke in finding 
Respondent had a monthly shortfall after deducting his expenses from his net income; he actually 
has a surplus, which is what the Court intended to say. However, in running the numbers, the 
Court also finds a mathematical error. Accordingly, the Court corrects the mathematical errors, as 
it promised it would: 
Petitioner: 
gross monthly income 
estimated taxes of 20% 
estimated net income 
child support 
disposable income 
reasonable monthly expenses 
shortfall 
alimony 
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Respondent: 
$1 ] 0,000 gross annual income 
-30.800 estimated taxes of 28% 
$ 79,200 estimated net annual income 
- 1 2 
= $6,600 net monthly income 
- £6.439 reasonable monthly expenses ($5,792 mo. living exp. + $667 child support) 
$ 161 estimated surplus each month 
- $ 1.428 alimony payment to Petitioner 
- $ 1,267 net shortfall after paying alimony 
As this analysis shows, the Court attempted to equalize the parties" standard of living, 
leaving each with the same shortfall in meeting their monthly expenses. Thus, the Court orders 
Respondent to pay a corrected sum of alimony in the amount of $1,428 per month to equalize the 
parties' standard of living. This payment shall be for a period of five years, commencing July 1, 
2008. Thereafter the alimony is reduced to $1,000 per month on July 1, 2013, for another five 
years, and then the alimony is reduced to $800 per month until December 31, 2015, at which time 
alimony shall terminate. In any event, alimony shall terminate upon Petitioner's remarriage or 
death. 
Petitioner's Objection 10: Petitioner's objection regarding the property division and debts 
only argues the evidence but offers no evidence of clear error. The Court adequately explained 
the equities and its decision. 
Petitioner's Objection 11: Based on the testimony presented and judging the credibility of 
the witnesses, the Court found Petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses to be $4,967 and 
Respondent's to be $5,762. Attached to this ruling is the Court's findings for each claim of a 
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party's reasonable monthly expenses, denominated on the schedule as H for Respondent and W 
for Petitioner. In arriving at these expenses, the Court initially determined the reasonableness of 
each party's requested expense. Next, the Court attempted to equalize those expenses where 
appropriate to achieve an equalization of their standard of living, based on the duration of the 
marriage. Individual differences do exist, however. In some instances, a party made no claim for 
an item of expense but the other party did. If the expense seemed reasonable and applicable to 
both, the Court gave it to both parties. In other instances, however, the Court could see a factual 
basis to support a finding that the party intentionally omitted the expense. If neither party asked 
for an expense and the Court felt that expenses were reasonably necessary, the Court, in those 
couple instances, imputed a reasonable expense to them (e.g., neither party asked for hair care, 
but the Court deems that a reasonable and necessary expense for both parties). 
Petitioner's Objection 12: Fundamentally, the parties do not have a long-term marriage; 
thus permanent alimony, in the Court's judgment, was not appropriate, notwithstanding the 
greater appearance of fault by Respondent. The Court was further of the opinion that a gradual 
diminution of alimony is equitable and gives Petitioner incentive along the way to improve her 
job skills and become increasingly self-sufficient. 
Petitioner's Objection 13: This issue has been adequately addressed. 
Petitioner's Objection 14: This issue has been adequately addressed. 
Petitioner's Objection 15: This issue has been adequately addressed and explained in the 
Court's original decision. True, Respondent received his business value of $20,300 and his 
retirement of $12,500, compared to her retirement of $2,500. However, he is assuming most of 
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the marital debt. Specifically, the Court ordered that he assume $79,000 in credit card debt and 
between $60,000 and $125,000 to Brant Boyer, depending on whom the Court believes most. 
The Court ordered Petitioner to repay a relatively small amount owing to her father. While the 
Court allocated $770 per month for the indebtedness Respondent assumes, he presented evidence 
of a monthly debt service of $3,605. Plainly, Respondent will need to either borrow more money 
to service the debt or work harder or longer hours. Thus, while there is a disparity in the 
allocation of their personal property, it pales in comparison to the stress and responsibility, 
including mounting interest payments, Respondent assumes to timely discharge the debt. The 
alternative was to equalize the property and assess Petitioner with a huge debt responsibility that 
the Court felt she could not and would not discharge. That posed professional problems for 
Respondent if Petitioner filed a bankruptcy on her share of the debt, as Respondent testified. The 
Court also felt that these parties needed a clean break from each other without lingering property 
ownership entanglements. These are judgments well within the Court's discretion. Thus, 
everything considered, the property division and debt allocation seems equitable. If anything, it is 
Respondent who could complain but has not. The parties otherwise agreed to a division of their 
household goods and other miscellaneous property, and that division stands. 
Petitioner's Objection 16: Petitioner's concerns are captured in the preceding paragraph. 
Petitioner's Objection 17: Petitioner's concerns are captured in the explanation to 
Petitioner's objection 15. 
Petitioner's Objection J9 (Petitioner omitted a no. 18): Petitioner's objection is not 
entirely clear; however, if Petitioner is asking that, as a condition to claiming the dependency 
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exemption in any year, Respondent must be current in that tax year, the Court agrees. 
Petitioner's Objection 20: See response to objection no. 15. 
Conclusion 
Petitioner's motion to vacate the original decree of divorce is denied. Her objections are 
overruled, except as otherwise expressed in this ruling. The Court requests that Mr. Cummings 
file with the Court amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of divorce to reflect 
any needed change in the original documents, as reflected in this ruling. 
Dated this ff- day of December, 2009. 
Wici/w g 0. Upo-
Michael D. Lyon, Judge I 
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